Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

conception of a monarch seem singularly ridiculous when emphasized as an important feature.

Unless signs fail, the people of the United States are to make an increasing demand for the reform and expansion of law to suit the new social and economic conditions. It is the privilege and duty of ethical theory to contribute conceptions which will aid legislatures and courts in their task—to take the words of the Federal Supreme Court—of "so dealing with the conditions which exist as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people."

JAMES H. TUFTS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDE.*

W. R. SORLEY.

THE portrait of the philosopher has been drawn by many hands and from different points of view, sometimes by his friends, more frequently perhaps by his foes. Pictures of the latter sort are familiar, and have on occasion been preserved for us by the humor of the philosopher himself. He strays through the world aimlessly, of no use to anyone else and but a helpless creature himself, a stargazer who stumbles on the beaten highway,—this is the practical man's idea of him. Or he appears as a spinner of cobwebs, a man who mistakes his own fancies for realities and thinks nothing of evolving facts from his inner consciousness,—and this is how he often seems to the man of science. Yet again the artist or poet tends to look upon him as a cold analyst in whose hands the life and beauty of the world disappear:

> Do not all charms fly
> At the bare touch of cold philosophy?

---

* Inaugural Address to the Philosophical Society of the University of Liverpool.

It is well for the philosopher thus sometimes to see himself in caricature. It is his business to deal with the conceptions which enter into practical life, which are elaborated by the scientific inquirer, and which guide the artist's imagination; and, if he cannot gain the approbation of these specialists, he ought at least to be able to say something in explanation of their adverse opinion and in vindication of his own character.

It is not altogether vain to expect that this vindication may be inferred from the portrait of the philosopher as it has been drawn by himself. From it we may at any rate gather some idea of the attitude and temper which he regards as proper to his profession. Self-portraiture of this sort is not uncommon with the greater philosophical writers. Sometimes it is a mere sketch that we find, thrown off almost by the way, at other times we have a finished and full-length picture.

Of all these descriptions the most famous and most comprehensive is that which Plato connects with the meaning of the word philosophy. It is not wisdom that the word signifies, but love of wisdom.[1] And in the lover Plato finds the analogue of the philosopher: the soul of a philosopher guileless and true is as the soul of a lover.[2] The lover who follows and worships beauty is already on the path which leads to philosophy. "The true order of going . . . is to use the beauties of earth as steps" towards celestial beauty. Going thus "from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is."[3]

And as love, if it have its way, lands one in philosophy, so the philosopher also displays all the features of love.

---

[1] Phædrus, 278.

[2] Phædrus, 249.

[3] Symposium, 211. (Jowett's translation.)

For Love, as the myth has it, is half divine and half human, the offspring of Plenty and Poverty:

> He is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is hard-featured and squalid, and has no shoes nor a house to dwell in. [But] he is bold, enterprising, and strong, a hunter of men, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, and never wanting resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist. [4]

He shares the characters of both his parents, allied to the gods and yet among the poorest of the poor. No god or wise man is a seeker after wisdom: he does not need to seek after that which he has already got. And the ignorant and foolish do not seek wisdom, for they do not feel the want of it. Thus the philosopher is in a mean betwixt two, just as Love was born of opposites.

> Wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean betwixt the wise and the ignorant. And this again is a quality which Love inherits from his parents; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. [5]

The most essential point in this description,—so it seems to me,—is not the fervor, the passion, the disinterestedness, with which the seeker follows truth, as the lover does his object. Undoubtedly this is a real characteristic. Plato holds that to the philosopher, as to the lover, all things pale, in importance, in comparison with one: the world is naught until he possesses the object of his search. But this fervor, this disinterestedness, springs from a deeper source. What is it that causes the restless eagerness of the lover? Plato's mythology is bold enough to answer, It is because the object which he seeks was once part of himself, till a jealous god divided them, and he cannot rest until he has regained what is akin to him by nature. And this is the poetical rendering of the answer to the other question, when we ask,

---

[4] Symp., 203.

[5] Symp., 204.

What is it that impels the philosopher to his unresting search for truth? the reply must be: Because there is a natural affinity between his mind and the truth which he seeks. He is not yet wise, for truth has to be sought; he can never be completely wise, for there are hindrances to the full view of truth which mortal nature can never finally overcome. But he is not altogether ignorant: if he were he would have no impulse to philosophy; he can recognize the truth when he sees it, and this shows that his mind is allied to truth, and has kinship with it. Therefore the philosopher does not need to wait for truth to come to him from the outside. He is himself active in its pursuit, driven onwards by an impulse which is of identical nature with the goal to which he presses.

Covered as it is with poetical and mythical imagery, this is the dominating feature in the Platonic portrait of the philosopher. In his speculative activity the philosopher is simply seeking to realize his own inmost nature; truth is not something imposed upon him from without; it is his own reason made manifest. There are other features than this in Plato's view; but they are, I think, less essential. Such, in particular, is the view that the rational activity of the soul is clogged and impeded by the body, so that philosophy,—the true life of the soul,—becomes necessarily a meditation of death. Important as this view may have been for Plato himself at one time of his life, and powerful as it has been in most Oriental conceptions of the philosophic and religious life, it is yet a detail due to the belief in a fundamental opposition between soul and body. The effects of this belief have been too profound for me to wish to minimize its importance. But it is not essential to the conception of the philosophical attitude as an active process in which the soul realizes what is akin to its own nature,—the vision of truth and reality.

This view of truth and the philosopher's attitude to it finds its most characteristic opponent in the conception of truth as merely the mirroring of an order of nature

which is altogether external to it. In the early days of modern thought Bacon gave expression to this doctrine in the famous aphorism that into the kingdom of nature as into the kingdom of grace entrance can only be obtained *sub persona infantis*. If this view holds true, then the philosopher's attitude should not be creative, as Plato thought; it should be receptive only. He must watch and wait for nature's teaching, and to it he must submit his mind. It is true that by this submission he may be able in a measure to reverse the relation and become nature's master. But his mastery extends only to a certain manipulation of natural forces so that they may be utilized for works of practical advantage. For practical purposes he seeks control; but of his philosophical attitude submission is the keynote: the mind has no creative or even anticipatory function; it has to follow, not to lead. In the Platonic view the primacy belongs to mind. In Bacon's, nature is not only first; it is hardly too much to say that it is everything; for it is the declared purpose of Bacon's method to make the path to scientific comprehension so level and uniform, that mental caliber will count for nothing and that any and every mind may travel on the road to truth with equal security of reaching the goal. This then is the fundamental opposition: while Plato insists on the creative function of mind, Bacon distrusts the mind left to itself, and forbids any anticipation of nature.

From the founders of modern philosophy we may extract yet another picture of the philosopher's attitude. To Descartes the attitude of the philosopher is essentially one of criticism. His familiar injunction that we must doubt wherever we can doubt before we can be assured of truth, has impressed on the modern consciousness an ideal of the solitude of the thinker's career. The philosopher must seek out each truth for himself; he can admit nothing which does not compel his individual assent. He is the critic of all creeds, however many their adherents, if by any means he may reach thereby some assured con-

viction for his own soul. On the one hand, therefore, the Cartesian appeals to reason; and this reason we may either interpret in the full Platonic sense, or we may allow it to fall to the humbler level on which Bacon placed the understanding. On the other hand, it is to individual reason that the appeal is made. Nothing can be taken on trust. The slow stages by which truth reveals itself in the consciousness of the race find no recognition, and no value is allowed them for any man's thinking. Each individual must examine and ascertain for himself; would he be a philosopher he must cut himself off from all historical belief; there is one test of truth only,—the clear consciousness that a proposition cannot be denied.

What truth there is in this view of the solitude of the philosophical thinker, and what the true relation is between individual conviction and historical beliefs, I cannot even attempt to inquire; the inquiry would lead too far away from the points which I have more immediately in view.

In all these descriptions there is one thing,—and that of the greatest significance,—which is not made clear. What exactly is it that distinguishes the attitude of the philosopher from that of the inquirer who is occupied with one of the special sciences? To a large extent clearly their attitudes must be the same. The scientist should be animated by the enthusiastic love of truth which inspires the philosopher in Plato's portrait; he should exhibit the loyalty to fact which Bacon enjoined; he should have the independence of judgment,—the trust in reason only,—on which Descartes laid stress. In all this we do not get the distinctive features of the philosopher as such. Even Plato had not separated them in thought from the features which all men of science should display.

Yet no one knew better than Plato the difference between the work of special branches of knowledge and that synoptic view of reality which is the mark of the philosopher. Indeed this word of Plato's, 'synoptic,' may be

taken as describing one view of the distinctively philosophical attitude,—a view which, in its modern form, has diverged in many respects from the Platonic. The scientist is necessarily occupied with one special department; the philosopher must strive after a conception of the whole of things. Thus the specialist has grown to be suspicious of the philosopher as a smatterer, a jack-of-all-trades, who interferes in everybody's business, without being himself master of any. This is undoubtedly his danger. But it is a mistake to suppose that the philosopher has no specialty,—if by that be meant a problem, a sphere of inquiry, which is distinctively his own. His place is in the central exchange of human knowledge. And yet the metaphor is a poor one. For his business is not simply to put different specialists into communication with one another; he has to interpret the results of each in the interests of the whole of knowledge.

What then is his attitude in the solution of this distinctive problem? How must he comport himself to the results of the sciences? Is he simply to piece them together, and then present this combination of particulars, in some general form, as the truth about the universe as a whole so far as ascertainable in the existing state of the sciences? This—or something like it—would be the Baconian account of his attitude. But 'anticipation of nature' cannot be excluded even from the special sciences, in which advance depends upon hypothesis. It is not possible to make a whole out of a few scattered fragments without the ideal contribution of the intellect. Least of all is this possible in the unification of knowledge out of the special sciences: it needs creative function to make a One out of many. We must remember, however, that in some sense the same holds of the scientific attitude of mind. It, too, seeks unity in the multiplicity of particulars; it selects the significant, infers the cause, and generalizes the phenomena. The facts alone do not give these results; they do not even compel them, except for the understanding mind. Hence, if philosophy

is nothing more than a coördination of the results of the sciences, the philosophical attitude does not appear to be essentially different from the scientific. One group of facts or relations after another is merged into a higher order or shown to be subordinate to it. The methods which enable us to pass from lower to higher, within the field of scientific generalization, would seem to require no fundamental change when we pass to the final generalization which expresses our intellectual attitude to the world as a whole.

And so it might be were all human interests merely intellectual. But doing and feeling are as fundamental as thinking. Perhaps they are even more fundamental; for it is at least a tenable view that thought had its origin in mankind because it served to facilitate the doing of things. However this may be, the interests are different; and the difference may be described as one of point of view; we may look at things simply in order to understand their occurrences, or with a regard to their worth or value.

And this worth or value may be of different kinds, each of which may have its appropriate method of inquiry. Just as one science differs from another according to the department of fact with which it deals, so we may distinguish different sciences (or different studies) of value,—practical, æsthetical, and so on. Further, just as we regard all the special sciences as capable of being subordinated to one supreme and architectonic science, so we must seek for some general account of the nature and laws of value. This general theory of value might perhaps, by stretching the meaning of an old term, be called Ethics; or a new term, Axiology, might be used for it. But, by whatever name we call it, the need is clear for a general treatment,—or general theory,—of value. This treatment of value has as good claim to be called philosophy as that coördination of the special sciences by which the title is sometimes monopolized. Historically its claim is undoubted; in all ages the quest of beauty

and goodness has belonged to the philosopher as well as the pursuit of truth. And the reason for this is more than historical. Worth is as fundamental a conception as reality; appreciation as fundamental an attitude as description,—or even as any form of interpretation which does not itself involve appreciation.

No two attitudes toward experience can be more distinct than these two. We may understand events after the manner of the sciences and yet be without any appreciation of their worth or significance for life. Even if we could express the universe in a single formula, so that the present carried with it to our mind both the clear record of the past from which it has sprung, and at the same time enabled us to foretell the whole course of future history,—even in this case, with all the fullness of knowledge which can be imagined as belonging to man, there might be complete absence of any appreciation of value: nothing might seem more worth doing or more worth having than anything else; there would be one event to the righteous and to the wicked. Or, rather, 'righteous' and 'wicked' would be terms without any meaning; beauty as well as virtue, utility and pleasure even, would be words and nothing more. Lack of practical interest, of moral or of æsthetical appreciation, would not even put any difficulty in the way of the scientific understanding of things; though assuredly no man of science is without such appreciation. On the other hand the attitude of appreciation,—whether moral or practical or æsthetic,—cannot be entirely divorced from some knowledge or ideas about the objects which call forth this attitude. But there is no kind of proportion between the two attitudes; the artist or the man of moral insight may have the slightest of scientific equipments, and his mind may harbor many erroneous beliefs about the universe. The world of values forms a system by itself. It need not be independent of the system of reality as known; but it is different from it and it supplements it. If it were entirely absent, we should neither

know, nor care about knowledge, for truth itself falls within the system of worth; it has value for the rational being. However knowledge may have begun, it has now a value of its own; we estimate the value of particular facts and particular theorems by their tendency to realize in our minds the system of truth, whether for some one science or for a comprehensive view of things as a whole.

We need not assume that there is any fundamental incoherence between the two worlds of facts and of values. But they are different and must not be confused; we may be able to describe without attaining to just appreciation; and insight into values is not always accompanied by a true understanding of cause and effect or of the other relations of the real. Nor can inquiry along one of these lines only satisfy the demands,—even the intellectual demands,—of a being who is capable of acting and feeling as well as of knowing. The complete philosopher must be a citizen of both worlds; his final and most characteristic task must be the reconciliation of the two authorities.

The most obvious way by which this reconciliation may be sought, and has been sought, is by subordinating one of them to the other: values have been reduced to facts, or facts have been regarded as created by values. In the former method the philosopher's attitude of mind is identified with that of the scientist; in the latter it is subordinated to that of the practical man or artist or moralist; and each method calls for remark.

Of the first this may be said: All values, it is contended, resolve themselves into facts of experience. A thing's utility is in the works it produces and their subservience to our purposes, and these purposes are realized only in our future experiences. Goodness and beauty also are of the same nature; when we judge that a thing is good or feel it to be beautiful, this fact belongs to our mental life; as such its causes can be traced and its effects calculated. It is easy to see, however, that this way of explaining value as a fact explains everything

but the value of the fact; we are shown the causes of the good deed, but how good it is, or whether, after all, it is good and not evil,—for this no reason is given. So long as we keep to the system of causal connections, there is one explanation for good and evil, for beauty and ugliness. At some point in the chain of causal explanation the judgment of goodness or of beauty must enter, as it were, from without, or else it is not reached at all. Value is like life: it proceeds only from itself. It is a permanent and insistent element in experience; it is not the product of something other than itself.

It seems to have been the fate of philosophy to be the sport, from time to time, of the scientific conceptions which may happen to be most prominent at the period; and, under this influence, the value-conceptions have received a narrow 'scientific' explanation. In the seventeenth century mathematics gave the clue; the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were the day of the experimental and descriptive sciences; and the philosophers tended to be content with psychological explanations. For the thinkers of the later nineteenth century and after, the biological conception of evolution has had the same importance that mathematical method had for the thinkers of the seventeenth. It has also given currency to a type of philosophy in some respects similar. What is called Naturalism has had a revival, though in a modified form. The universe is no longer conceived as simply an equilibrium of interacting forces. This conception is supplemented and modified by the new emphasis laid on the historical process, which produces new combinations and accounts for the adaptations which exist between living beings and their environment. If he can give to goodness or to beauty its place in the historical process,—if he can show how the experience of it arose and to what other experiences it leads,—the naturalist is satisfied that he has done all that can possibly be done, that he has 'explained' goodness or beauty. That he has not really explained that which is its es-

sence, namely, its worth, but only traced its coming and going,—this has been already maintained. But something more has to be said about the method by which Naturalism seeks to explain value.

The method contains a subtle difficulty within itself. If everything is to be accounted for simply by its place in the evolutionary order, then reason also,—the faculty by which all explanation is contrived and received,—must submit to the same judgment. Intelligence and reasoning must have come gradually into being at the call of other phenomena which led up to them; there must have been many tentative and critical stages in the development before it got anything like a firm place as a characteristic of some types of conscious life. If the method of evolution holds upon which the biologists rely, then the earth must hide the remains of many unsuccessful varieties,—kinds of living beings which had struck out different sorts of ideas and other ways of combining them than those which have survived in the human race. Those other beings may have thought, for instance, that the part is equal to the whole, or that anything may be the cause of anything, or that contradictorily opposed propositions can both be true; and they got swept into the world's rubbish-heap because the possession of these ideas hindered instead of helping them in the competition for food and mates. What else can the naturalist mean by calling these ideas false? If he means anything more, he admits a standard of truth independent of nature and its all-pervading evolution. The ideas in question led to disaster and death; they were unsuccessful; they did not work; that is all he can mean by false. And, in the same way, he can mean by true only that which does work, which brings success, which preserves life or what else we may desire. Clearly, it is within a narrow range only that we can have grounds for being convinced of truth, if this is what truth means. A true idea is an idea which has survived because it tends to life; a false idea (if it is still believed) is one which happens to survive although

it tends to death rather than to life. The distinction may not suggest a very luminous criterion of truth. But it is all that can be got; and it ought perhaps to convince man of the vanity of attempting to know what lies beyond the empirical interests of his life.

In the days when Calvinists were still confident and militant in presence of the facile rationalism of their time, one was used to the argument that human nature was so utterly corrupted by the Fall that the reason of man was altogether untrustworthy in all matters of religion and theology. The doctrine is no longer heard in these days of temporizing theologians. The theory of the Descent of Man has taken the place of the old doctrine of the Fall; and the biological philosophers have served themselves heirs to the theologians. This is only one of the places where they have done so. But they are not fully conscious of their heritage, especially here. For their doctrine cuts at the very roots of their own position. If the biological process is to be taken as the final account of things, reason included, then certainly we have no right to speak of the truth of ideas in any other sense than this, that to hold them is of use to human beings within that little range of experience which preserves our life. How then can we justify ourselves in making any assertions about evolution or the universe as a whole? The naturalist has climbed to a great height on the tree of speculation, and he has then with infinite pains and deliberation cut off the branch which supported him. This reflection, however, is by the way. The point which I have more particularly in view is that the theory which makes reason a mere incident in the development of animal consciousness, and truth a short-hand expression for the survival of an idea due to its usefulness, cannot establish the conclusion that all worth also is but a stage in the process. If reason is only what the naturalist makes it, it cannot be trusted to explain the significance and worth which man finds in life and which he expresses in his moral and æsthetic ideals; for he has reduced reason to the posi-

tion of a mere instrument in the service of that most elementary value which consists in life-preservation.

The reconciliation of the world of fact or existence with the world of worth or values would be a problem easy to solve if we could reduce value to fact or fact to value. The former method has been tried, and we have seen not only that it shirks the explanation of the value that it sets out to explain, but that, in attempting to justify its procedure, it turns itself into its opposite, making all values depend upon something that is a mere instrument of those values that are lowest or most elementary. It is no matter of surprise, therefore, to find that this opposite line of thought has its adherents, and that the truth of every proposition about existence is made to consist in the value that it contributes to life. For the moment, indeed, the air is full of this doctrine; it is preached from the housetops, and no corner in the mansions of thought is so secluded as to be undisturbed by the reverberation. It is hopeless to escape the contention altogether. But I am reluctant to add to the noise of many voices; and what I have to say will be restricted to the limited purpose I have in view.

In the first place, from our present point of view we may begin by assuming that something objective is meant: when it is said that the true is the useful or the valuable, some objective utility or value is in view. Otherwise, if any kind or degree of utility will do, the same proposition may be useful to me and useless to you; it may even change its character from utility to uselessness and back again to utility many times a day. If this is what is meant, if any utility will serve, and the same proposition may be false to you and true to me, true now and false a minute hence, what shall we say of this proposition 'the true is the useful'? All we can say is that we have no use for it, and that accordingly it is not true, judged by the standard of truth set up by those who promulgate it.

Let us assume, then, that we have not to do with any

mere doctrine of relativity, that, when we are told that the true is the valuable or the useful, something objective and fairly precise is intended. Then we have to ask, In what sense is value used in this connection? For there are many different kinds of things to which we give this name: there is one value of goodness, and another of beauty, and yet another of that ordinary utility which consists in preserving life and promoting its conveniences. With which of these shall we identify the truth of fact and reality? If we take the last alternative and understand by value simply conduciveness to life and to the conveniences of living, then, as we have already seen, we must regard truth also as a kind of value and accordingly simply as a circumstance favorable to persistence in the struggle for life; and, looked at in this way, it is impossible to assert truth of naturalism or pragmatism or any such far-reaching philosophical theory: the engineer is hoist with his own petard. And if we take any other alternative than this, and identify truth with value in the sense of goodness or beauty, we lift the argument to a different plane. It is impossible to hold of all the particulars which enter, or can enter, into our experience, that their goodness or their beauty proves that they are true in the sense of really existing. The essence of all moral activity consists in realizing a good which did not exist before, and would not exist without, that activity; artistic production gives material embodiment to beauty which would remain unexpressed were it not for the artist's ideal and the artist's skill. The whole significance of human life,—perhaps the whole significance of the world's history,—rests upon an existing disparity between the present actualities of things and the values which may possibly be realized in or through them. If fact and value can be identified at all, it cannot be the fact of the moment or a particular fact or class of facts; reality must be fully realized before its nature can be equalized with our idea of value: as Plato held, if the good is the source of all reality, it cannot itself be identi-

fied with any part of the temporal process, but must stand above it in dignity and power,—the purpose and final cause of all reality.

And thus we return to our problem. In the opposition of fact and value,—or, to use more comprehensive terms, of reality and worth,—lies the fundamental divergence of human conceptions. The philosopher cannot be content with the attitude of the scientist, whose business is only with what is; nor is it enough for him to follow the moralist or the artist in the contemplation of that which should be. Their limitations belong to their purpose, which is a limited one; he seeks a further goal. Again and again the philosopher is tempted to find in that which is, the ground of what should be; and he is succeeded by others who seek in what should be, the ground of what is. In these speculations what is explained is too often simply explained away,—until it reasserts its rights and returns as the dominant conception in a system of opposite characteristics. The philosopher should hold firmly to both conceptions; but his view should extend into the distance in which they may perchance meet and be reconciled.

If this is the deepest problem and the final goal of speculative thought, then the Platonic portrait of the philosopher's attitude conveys a truer idea than the Baconian. Bacon's metaphor of childlike submission to nature's teaching is a very inadequate account even of the scientist's attitude: it would never have led to the interpretations of nature which form the achievements of modern science. The man of science has to go out to meet nature, trying and testing all her ways, until he himself succeeds in bringing to bear upon her processes the ideas by means of which they yield themselves to interpretation. Yet, great as are the scientific uses of the imagination, they are necessarily limited by the sole and sufficient purpose of science, that of understanding the nature and laws of things. So far as he is seeking this understanding only, the philosopher must follow the endeavor of the scientist to give a true rendering of what

is. But he cannot restrict himself to this problem without ignoring the greatest of human interests. The nature of reality and the meaning of worth appeal to him equally. To attain a point of view from which their relations are intelligible is the object of his search; and this involves something more than loyalty to facts; it needs equal loyalty to ideals of worth. That it is hard to maintain the attitude of impartial regard to fact, on the one hand, and to ideal, on the other, need not be denied. That it is still harder to reach the point of view that will comprehend them both harmoniously, is obvious. It may be that no philosopher has ever attained, or ever will attain, a fully satisfactory solution. He may be fated always to be a seeker. But the search is not therefore vain. Science, as we have seen, has to frame and use conceptions which go far beyond the mere data of sense-perception, and their abundant verification is evidence of a harmony between the intellect of man and the truth of things. His ideas of worth lay claim to a similar objectivity. And it is this that justifies the creative attitude of the speculative philosopher. It is because his own mind has in it something akin both to objective fact and to objective worth that he embarks on the quest for their final synthesis.

W. R. Sorley.

Cambridge.

CHRISTIAN MORALS AND THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN.

IN the light of the current materialistic outlook and the current skepticism touching supernatural matters, some question may fairly be entertained as to the religious cult of Christianity. Its fortunes in the proximate future, as well as its intrinsic value for the current scheme of civilization, may be subject to doubt. But a